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Small unmanned aircraft systems present both an opportunity and a challenge for the U.S. Army, and significant change is required to realize the opportunity, according to a recent RAND Corporation report.
“UAS are changing the way wars are fought,” the report notes, adding Ukrainian and Russian troops are constantly innovating and changing how UAS are used as both offensive and defensive systems.
“This is a dynamic field in which innovation occurs quickly, both within the military and in the private sector,” the report adds.
The pace of innovation also is making it harder to field and maintain cutting edge, Small UAS-enabled forces.
“Operational and institutional agility will be necessary if the Army is to dominate on future battlefields. In the months and years ahead, it will be important to gather lessons learned from experimentation, training, and operations (including in Ukraine and perhaps other combat zones), to analyze these lessons, and to innovate aggressively,” argues the report.
Released April 8, the RAND report is an overview of a five-part series that relied on interviews with Army and private-sector experts, as well as reviews of existing literature on the role of UAS in the war in Ukraine.
Institutional and real-world obstacles are limiting the Army’s ability to conduct training at scale, the report contends.
Those obstacles include spectrum-allocation issues caused by the need to deconflict with civilian usage, airspace-management issues, and acquisition and accountability policies.
RAND interviews revealed many units do not use their SUAS “aggressively” in training due to a fear of being held financially liable for their loss.
To reach a higher tolerance of loss, RAND says a change in the application of the Army’s Financial Liability Investigations of Property Loss program would be needed to acknowledge the benefit of training outweighs the loss.
The Army faces a further hurdle in producing units that can effectively use SUAS.
“The 2023 training pipeline for SUAS operators was insufficient in terms of basic qualification throughput and preparing expert operators and, unless changed, will be overwhelmed when the Army starts fielding SUAS in greater numbers,” the report states.
The interviews found few units move beyond “basic operator-level proficiency or plan for the integration of SUAS in combined arms operations” and that unit SUAS training plans lack easily adoptable models.
“Finally, counter-UAS training needs to be integrated across echelon collective training, which includes creating Opposing Force UAS assets,” the report recommends.
“The Army can solve or waive many of the obstacles to train the way it fights, but this requires Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) attention and urgency.”
On Monday, the Defense Department’s Defense Innovation Unit announced Project G.I., a process to develop “ready now” solutions to battlefield needs.
“Today, warfighters lack the unmanned systems needed to train for combat and prevail if called upon to use them,” said Doug Beck, the DIU director. “DIU is laser focused on getting best-of-breed technology in the hands of the warfighter today and scaling it for training, adoption, and readiness.”
Both Army and Army National Guard units continue to train on the use of SUAS for both warfighting and disaster response purposes.
In February, Army Soldiers participated with the Washington Army Guard in a SUAS fundamentals course hosted by 898th Brigade Engineer Battalion, 81st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, at Yakima Training Center.
In April, Iowa Army Guard Soldiers trained at Camp Dodge Training Center on a system equipped with thermal imaging and low-light sensors to practice real-time reconnaissance and target identification.
The RAND report acknowledges its own analytic limitations given the dynamic nature of warfighting.
“One of the challenging aspects of this research project has been the rapidity with which SUAS and their uses are changing,” the analysts concede.
“A key factor in understanding SUAS needs and limitations is technical — how does what is needed compare with what is possible?” they conclude.
─ By Jennifer Hickey
