Date
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J 14 D Add CA
Category
Joint
State
California
Type Draft
Add Item
Proposal Statement
Implement a comprehensive campaign to begin protecting mobility(MAF), combat(CAF) aviation and Air Operations Center (AOC)assets from cyber threats by:
(1)Proper “hygiene” practices involving connection of aviation platform, aviation equipment, avionics and support equipment to non-hardening (trusted) computer networks;
(2) On-aircraft monitoring of cyber threats using already fielded, proven cyber harden techniques involving aircraft interfaces;
(3) Command-wide cyber awareness training that communicates importance of proper hygiene practices and provides basics of cyber-attack methods.
(1)Proper “hygiene” practices involving connection of aviation platform, aviation equipment, avionics and support equipment to non-hardening (trusted) computer networks;
(2) On-aircraft monitoring of cyber threats using already fielded, proven cyber harden techniques involving aircraft interfaces;
(3) Command-wide cyber awareness training that communicates importance of proper hygiene practices and provides basics of cyber-attack methods.
Recommendation Information
US Defense posture requires rapid deployment of military assets over-seas to area of responsibility (AOR). Air Operations Centers (AOC) are the key component in forward deployment into the AOR, and as such are the first to be exposed to the ever increasing dynamic threats which are a reality in every part of the world. Cyber threats exists in a variety of forms and when deployed can deny aviation asset usage, critically shutting down aviation missions and the ability to communicate through an AOC. Cyber entry points include: Software Support Facilities, On-Aircraft interfaces, Aircraft Support Equipment and finally RF interfaces (radars, data links, voice radios).
Deployment of air assets in any theater necessitates the establishment of an AOC for that campaign. The rapid deployment of air assets and their support structure includes the Air and Space Operations Center. The AOC plays an essential role in forward deployment into the AOR. Cyber threats exist and continue to evolve in a variety of forms and when successfully deployed can deny aviation asset usage by blocking or mis directing aviation assets, and drastically reduce the effectiveness of any air missions. Cyber entry points include: Software Support Facilities, Support Equipment used for maintenance or uploads of new software, and finally RF interfaces (radars, data links, voice radios).
Implement a comprehensive campaign to begin hardening aviation and AOC assets. AOC Cyber Hardening effort consists of several elements that must be performed concurrently: 1) proper “hygiene” practices involving connection of AOC platform support equipment to non-hardening (trusted) computer networks; (2) AOC monitoring of Cyber threats using already fielded, proven Cyber harden techniques involving computer interfaces; (3) command-wide Cyber awareness training that communicates importance of proper hygiene practices and provides basics of Cyber-attack methods.
Deployment of air assets in any theater necessitates the establishment of an AOC for that campaign. The rapid deployment of air assets and their support structure includes the Air and Space Operations Center. The AOC plays an essential role in forward deployment into the AOR. Cyber threats exist and continue to evolve in a variety of forms and when successfully deployed can deny aviation asset usage by blocking or mis directing aviation assets, and drastically reduce the effectiveness of any air missions. Cyber entry points include: Software Support Facilities, Support Equipment used for maintenance or uploads of new software, and finally RF interfaces (radars, data links, voice radios).
Implement a comprehensive campaign to begin hardening aviation and AOC assets. AOC Cyber Hardening effort consists of several elements that must be performed concurrently: 1) proper “hygiene” practices involving connection of AOC platform support equipment to non-hardening (trusted) computer networks; (2) AOC monitoring of Cyber threats using already fielded, proven Cyber harden techniques involving computer interfaces; (3) command-wide Cyber awareness training that communicates importance of proper hygiene practices and provides basics of Cyber-attack methods.
Resolution No.
14
Item No
D
Additional State Sponsors
AZ, GA, KS, WI, TX, IL, MS, TN, PA
Fiscal Year
2017
Task Force
Domestic Operations